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SOME PROBLEMS IN THE COLLECTION OF CHECKS
ROBERT T. DoNr-Y*
The welter of conflicting decisions, banking practices and
local customs has given rise to legislation dealing with the subject,
both actual and contemplated. In 1931 West Virginia enacted the
Bank Collection Code1 (hereinafter called the "Code"), sponsor-
ed by the American Bankers' Association. The National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has also prepared
a more comprehensive act? dealing with the subject (hereinafter
called the "Uniform Act"). It is the purpose of this article to
discuss some of the problems attempted to be solved by such
legislation.
As To Parties Other Than Banks
"A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on
demand."' It must be presented for payment within a reason-
able time after its issue, or the drawer will be discharged from
liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.'
Indorsers are discharged under such circumstances although
loss did not result from the delay.' The holder must present the
check, or place it in the course of collection during banking hours
of the next business day after receipt of the same." It has been
held that notwithstanding the provision of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law that presentment of a bill of exchange is sufficient if
made "within a reasonable time of the last negotiation thereof,"
this does not alter the rule that "so far as the drawer of a check
is concerned it must be presented within a reasonable time after
* Member of the Bar, Morgantown, West Virginia.
IW. Va. Acts 1931, c. 15, Senate Bill No. 66, passed March 11, 1931, in
effect 90 days from passage.
'See HANiBOO OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OP COMMISSIONERS ON
UNirORMx STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS, 1930, pp. 305-329 and idem, 1931,
pp. 253-255.
W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 46, art. 16, § 2.
Ibd, c. 46, art. 16, § 3.
'Swift & Co. v. Miller, 62 Ind. App. 312, 113 N. E. 447 (1916) and the
many eases cited in the opinion.
41bid. The court said: "Under the rules of the law merchant, a check
must be presented within a reasonable time after it is received."
"Under ordinary conditions when the holder resides at the place the
check is made payable, such reasonable time for presentment includes all
of the banking hours of the day immediately following the day on which
the check is received."
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its issue, regardless of the time of the last negotiation thereof. "
But one who acquires an unpresented check a "considerable time"
after it was issued may nevertheless be a holder in due course as
to defenses existing between the drawer and payee.' Where the
facts are undisputed, the question of what is a reasonable time
is one of law for the court,' but if the evidence is conflicting, it
is to be determined from the evidence."' If the owner of the
check has notice that the drawee is on the verge of insolvency, he
must make presentment at the earliest opportunity." The owner
7Cellars v. Dwinnell, 285 Pac. 181 (Mont. 1930). But in this case the loss
was caused by the wrongful refusal of the drawee to honor checks unless
presented over the counter.
$Anderson v. Elem, 111 Kan. 713, 208 Pac. 573 (1922). In this case
the defendant drew a check Oct. 20, 1919, at night, on a Wichita bank,
and stopped payment the next morning before the bank opened, claiming
failure of consideration. The payee did not present the check. Defendant
made no effort to secure its return to him. The check was cashed at Salina
on November 14, by plaintiff, an innocent purchaser, who presented it, and
the bank refused payment. The court said that the N. I. L. provision of
presentment within a reasonable time was the law before its passage; that
"'Stopping payment is equivalent to withdrawing the deposit." ....
Negotiation of a check as a bill of exchange is one of the privileges of the
payee, and the drawer does not suffer loss, within the meaning of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, by the fact that the payee chooses to transfer
the paper, instead of presenting it for payment himself."
"f a check be negotiated to an innocent purchaser, it stands on the
same footing as other negotiable paper with respect to defenses the drawer
may interpose when sued on the instrument."
See also in accord, Bull v. First National Bank, 123 U. S. 105, 8 S. Ct.
62 (1881) holding that a bona fide purchaser of a check from an indorsee,
although such purchase was long after the date of the check, is protected
against set-offs acquired in the meantime by the drawer against such in-
dorser.
Colwell v. Colwell, 92 Ore. 103, 179 Pac. 916 (1919). In Lloyd Mort-
gage Co. v. Davis, 51 N. D. 336, 199 N. W. 869 (1914) the court said that
"What is a reasonable time depends on the circumstances of each case. In
determining that question, the time, mode, and place of receiving the check,
and the relations of the parties should be considered."
Empire-Arizona Copper Co. v. Shaw, 20 Ariz. 471, 181 Pac. 464 (1919).
There defendant company drew check on Commercial Bank, payable to
plaintiff, on May 31, 1917. On June 1st plaintiff presented it to drawee
bank for payment, the company then having sufficient funds to cover same.
The bank did not pay the check; the company offering evidence that plain-
tiff demanded bills of larger denomination than the bank had, and upon
being refused same, refused to cash the check in smaller bills; the plaintiff
offering evidence that the bank teller stated that the bank was short of
cash and asked him to return the next day. Plaintiff did not do so, but
went to Los Angeles and there deposited the check for collection, on Juno
9th. The drawee bank became insolvent on June 10th. The trial court,
in lieu of a jury, upheld plaintiff's version.
The court held that under the negotiable instruments law, a check must
be presented within a reasonable time after its issue; that where the evi-
dence is conflicting, this was a question of fact to be determined from the
evidence. A recovery was upheld.
nFirst Nat. Bank of Kewanee v. Wine, 255 Ill. App. 578 (1930); Sin-
lair Refining Co. v. Keith, 97 Okla. 55, 221 Pac. 1003 (1924); Blackwelder
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may deposit the check in his own bank, although the drawee bank
is in the same city.? And, where the payee deposits the check to
his own account in the drawee bank and the latter closes on the
same day, the loss falls on the drawer if the payee had no notice
of the bank's insolvent condition.' If the payee, after accepting
the check, negligently decides that it should be for a larger amount
and returns it, but later again accepts it, and as a result of the
delay in presentment a loss occurs, the payee must suffer.' But
if he refuses to accept the check because tendered in full settle-
ment of a disputed account, then later accepts it, and thereafter
exercises due diligence in its collection, the drawer must bear the
loss.' In Lewis, Hubbard & Company v. Supply Co. the court
held that the drawer, in delivering a check to an agent of the
payee having no authority to indorse, at the place of business of
the drawer, impliedly agrees to allow such additional time for
presentment as may be necessary for transmission to the agent's
principal. It has been commonly held, and is now the rule by
statute, that when a bank certifies a check at the request of the
drawer, before delivery to the payee, the drawer is not discharged
if the check is not paid on due presentment;17 but if the payee,
after receiving the check, procures the certification, he then ac-
cepts the bank as his sole debtor to the same effect as if he had
drawn out the funds, redeposited them and taken a certificate of
deposit' This inadequate summary of elementary principles
serves merely as an introduction to the more complicated problems
of collection.
v. Fergus Motor Co., 80 Mont. 374, 260 Pac. 734 (1927). See comment on
this case in (1927) 37 YAIL L. J. 273.
2 Bistline v. Benting, 39 Ida. 534, 228 Pac. 309 (1924).
B3Hermann, et al. v. Cohen, 119 So. 1 (Ala. 1928). Cf. Clarke v. Davis,
281 Pac. 3 (Idaho, 1929).
"Koch v. Sanford Loan, etc., Co., 220 Mo. App. 396, 286 S. W. 732
(1926).
'5Kling Bros. & Co. v. Whipps, 132 Okla. 253, 270 Pac. 79 (1928). (Com-
missioner's opinion).
2659 W. Va. 75, 52 S. E. 1017 (1906). Contra, Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Keith, supra n. 11 (semble).
"'City of Brunswick v. People's Savings Bank, 194 Mo. App. 360, 190
S. W. 60 (1916).
8ITbid. W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 46, art. 16, § 55 provides: "Where
the holder of a check procures it to be accepted or certified, the drawer
and all indorsers are discharged from liability thereon." Cf. First Nat.
Bank v. Currie, 147 Mich. 72, 110 N. W. 499 (1907), where it was con-
tended that the usual rule should not obtain because the indorsers suf-
fered no loss by reason of the certification since the check was duly pre-
sented and protested. The court overruled this contention on the ground
that the plaintiff had parted with value not on the strength of the indorse-
ment, but on the strength of the certification.
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Title to a Check in the Process of Collection
It has been said that "there is nothing, apparently, more
elusive or difficult to locate than the title to a bank check in the
process of collection."" The structure of collections is erected
around the framework of the relations between the depositor of
the check, the bank of deposit, and subsequent banks in the col-
lection chain. Unfortunately, but perhaps necessarily, these re-
lations hinge largely upon questions of title as determined by the
form of indorsement.
Of the possible relations (exclusive of trust) that may exist
between a depositor and his bank of deposit, only two are of im-
portance here: (1) that of principal and agent, and (2) that of
seller and purchaser. There has been little agreement among the
courts. The Code rather blandly assumes that the distinction be-
tween restrictive and non-restrictive indorsements is well-settled,
but, as between the depositor and the bank of deposit provides that
the endorsement "for deposit" shall be deemed restrictive." The
Uniform Act takes the opposite position, and in addition includes
in non-restrictive indorsements those "for credit," "for account"
of the indorser, or words having a similar import.' The Code
provides that the indorsement "pay any bank or banker" shall be
deemed restrictive, creating an agency relationship in any subse-
quent bank to which the paper is forwarded." The Uniform Act
as drafted in 1930 provided that the indorsement "pay any bank,
banker or trust company" should be restrictive" (not limiting
its effect to subsequent banks), but the 1931 draft reverses this
position and makes the indorsement non-restrictive." It is hardly
necessary to state that the indorsements "for collection," "for
collection and credit" and "for collection and remittance" are
restrictive.
In addition to the form of indorsement other considerations
have entered into the determination of the passage of title, such
as permitting the depositor to draw against the deposit immed-
iately; or passbook or deposit-slip stipulations that all items are
credited subject to final payment; or reserving the right to charge
back.' The Code is silent as to these matters, but the Uniform
29 BRADY, THE LAw or BANK CHEois (1915) § 212, p. 310.
20 Code, supra n. 1, § 4.
" Uniform Act, ,upra n. 2, § 2.
" Code, supra n. 1, § 4.
"Supra n. 21.
HADBooK, 1931, supra n. 2.
The cases dealing with the questions here involved are collected and
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Act provides as to items on others than the bank of deposit, of-
fered "for immediate credit" (as defined therein)," they shall be
deemed purchased notwithstanding, among other special facts,
that an agreement was had deferring the depositor's right to draw
against the credit, or that the bank was authorized to charge back
the amount.' It is, however, provided that credit will be deemed
given provisionally in the case of checks. The result, therefore,
of the Uniform Act is to make the bank of deposit a purchaser of
the check." But it is indicative of an agency relationship to show:
(a) a prior course of dealing on an agency basis, (b) special in-
structions for handling the items, (c) a charge usually or actually
made for the service, (d) and, prima facie, indorsements "for
collections," "for collection and credit," "for collection and re-
mittance. "M
The Code, on the contrary, seeks to make the bank of deposit
not a purchaser but an agent for collection. Under its provisions,'
this agency relation exists both as to the bank of deposit and as to
any subsequent bank except (1) as otherwise provided by agree-
ment, and (2) as to subsequent holders of a negotiable instrument:
analyzed in detail in an exhaustive annotation in (1921) 11 A. L. R. 1043,
supplemented in (1930) 68 A. L. R. 725. It is believed that no useful
purpose would be served by a lengthy discussion here. See Neill v. Rogers
Produce Co., 41 W. Va. 37, 23 S. E. 706 (1895). See also Baker, Bank
Deposits and Collections, (1912) and Turner, Deposits of Demand Paper
as Purchases (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 874.
Supra n. 2, J 21.
' Tbid. § 22.
25Ibid. § 23.
"'Ibid. The Committee's note to the section states that "the plan here
adopted is to codify the majority decisions that such items are purchased
and to qualify the bank's responsibility in the collection aspects of the
0Ibid. § 26. The Committee's note to this section criticizes the provi-
sion of the Code to the effect that where any revocable credit for an item
has been withdrawn the bank shall have all the rights of an owner thereof
against prior and subsequent parties to the extent of the amount with-
drawn, as an attempt to make the bank both an agent and an owner, as
to one item.
The text of § 2 is as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by agreement and except as to subse-
quent holders of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer or indorsed
specially or in blank, where an item is deposited or received for collection,
the bank of deposit shall be agent of the depositor for its collection and
each subsequent collecting bank shall be sub-agent of the depositor but
shall be authorized to follow the instructions of its immediate forwarding
bank and any credit given by any such agent or sub-agent bank therefor
shall be revocable until such time as the proceeds are received in actual
money or an unconditional credit given on the books of another bank, which
such agent has requested or accepted. Where any such bank allows any
revocable credit for an item to be withdrawn, such agency relation shall
nevertheless continue except the bank shall have all the rights of an owner
5
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(a) payable to bearer, (b) indorsed specially, or (c) indorsed in
blank. The Section is particularly unsatisfactory in stating that
"where an item is deposited or received for collection ...." and
so on, because it fails to state how it shall, in point of fact, be
determined that the item is "deposited or received for collection"
as distinguished from a sale and purchase. One might, with equal
definition in terms of itself, state that when an item is offered
for sale the bank shall become its purchaser.
Since it is common banking practice to permit withdrawals
against deposits of checks before their collection, the Code pro-
vides that as to such items the agency relation shall continue but
the bank shall have the rights of an owner to the extent of the
amount withdrawn.' The Uniform Act has substantially the same
provision with the addition that "To determine which credits
should be charged with drawings for this purpose, it will be as-
sumed that first deposits are first paid out.'''
If an item is drawn on or payable at the bank of deposit the
credit is provisional, subject to revocation at or before the end
of the day on which the item is deposited in the event it is found
not payable for any reason."
From the foregoing analysis it will be seen, under the pro-
visions of the Code, that as to items drawn on banks other than
the bank of deposit, the latter is the depositor's agent for col-
lection, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, although the
indorsement be in blank, or special, or the item payable to bearer.
Each subsequent bank to which the item is forwarded becomes the
sub-agent of the depositor, and in addition if the item is indorsed




"Code, supra n. 1, § 3. The final sentence of the section is "Whenever
a credit is given for an item deposited after banking hours such right (sf
revocation may be exercised during the following business day."
Section 10 of the Uniform Act provides: "A bank which has given
credit within the preceding section for an item other than one issued, cer-
tified or accepted by such bank, shall owe no duty to its depositor to honor
drawings against such credit prior to the next business day after the item
was deposited, may do so at its election. An item deposited after the
close of business on any day shall, for purposes of this and the next pro-
ceding section, be deemed received on the next succeeding business day."
Tho purpose of these sections is to change the rule that when a depositor
offers for deposit a check drawn on the same bank by another depositor,
and credit is duly entered in the depositor's pass-book, the bank cannot
later revoke the credit, although the check may have created an overdraft.
See BRADY, op. cit. supra, n. 19, § 188.
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in blank, or specially, or is payable to bearer, the sub-agent may
rely upon the presumption that its predecessor is the owner.'
The Uniform Act does not thus baldly state that subsequent
banks shall be sub-agents of the depositor. It providesthat "All
items deposited over the counter or by mail with a bank for credit
or remittance, which are not drawn on, issued by or made or ac-
cepted payable at such bank, and which are not purchased by it,
will be deemed held by it, upon receipt, as agent."' The net re-
sult, therefore, is to make the bank of deposit the owner of the
check (but giving credit therefor provisionally), and to make sub-
sequent banks, sub-agents of the depositor.'
Apparently the main objects to be accomplished by making
the bank of deposit the purchaser of the check rather than the
depositor's agent are (1) to prevent the depositor from asserting
title to the instrument and reclaiming it in the course of collection
or from asserting a preferred claim, upon insolvency of the bank
of deposit;' (2) to prevent attachment by the creditors of the
depositor, and to permit the continuance of the collection process,
in the meantime permitting drawings against the credit.'
Some Rightts and Duties of the Parties
A, the payee of a check drawn by B, on Bank 2 in another
place, indorses it in blank and deposits it to his account in Bank
1. The latter must forward it not later than the next business
day."' It may forward it to a correspondent in a third place or in
Code, supra n. 1, § 4, par. 3, the applicable part of which provides:
"Where a deposited item is payable to bearer or indorsed by the de-
positor in blank or by special indorsement, the fact that such item is so
payable or indorsed shall not change the relation of agent of the bank of
deposit to the depositor, but subsequent holders shall have the right to rely
on the presumption that the bank of deposit is the owner of the item. The
indorsement of an item by the bank of deposit or by any subsequent holder
in blank or by special indorsement or its delivery when payable to bearer,
shall carry the presumption that the indorsee or transferee is owner pro-
vided there is nothing upon the face of the paper or in any prior indorse-
ment to indicate an agency or trustee relation of any prior party."
wUniform Act, supra n. 2, § 26.
"One of the objects, of course, in making subsequent banks sub-agents
of the depositor is to throw the risks of collection on the owner of the item.
This involves the adoption of the "Massachusetts rule" relieving the for-
warding bank from responsibility for any neglect, misconduct, mistake or
default of its immediate correspondent, or any subsequent bank, subject, of
course, to the exercise of due care in the selection of such correspondent.
These rules are codified in the Code, supra n. 1, § 5, and in the Uniform
Act, supra n. 2, § 42.
"Uniform Act, n. 2, § 24 and comment.
SOIbid., § 25 and comment.
Code, aupra n. 1, § 6 (a); Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 40.
7
Donley: Some Problems in the Collection of Checks
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1932
PROBLEMS IN COLLECTION OF CHECKS
the same place, or it may send it to the drawee,' Bank 2. In the
former case the correspondent is under the same duty to forward
not later than the next business day.' Upon receipt of the check
by the drawee it is, in contemplation of law, both an agent of the
depositor to present the check to itself for payment, and an agent
of the drawer to make payment by honoring the check. The Code
is defective in failing specifically to impose upon the drawee the
duty either to give credit or make remittance (if the check is
properly payable) not later than the next succeeding business
day." Neither the Code nor the Uniform Act expressly changes
the rule in cases like Clarke v. National Bank of Montana." In
that case the statute provided that "where a drawee to whom a
bill is delivered for acceptance destroys the same, or refuses with-
in 24 hours after such delivery, or within such other period as the
holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or nonaccepted to
the holder, he will be deemed to have accepted the same." It was
held that the failure of the drawee to return the check to the col-
lecting bank within 24 hours amounted to an acceptance, render-
ing the drawee liable, either for mere neglect or for tortious re-
fusal.
Assuming that B's check is in all respects "properly pay-
able" the drawee, Bank 2, depending upon instructions, either
credits Bank 1 with the amount of the check, instructs Bank 1 to
charge Bank 2s account with Bank 1, or remits the proceeds.
Credit may be given either on the books of the drawee or of any
"Ibid. These sections reverse the great weight of authority to the ef-
fect that it is negligence to forward the item directly to the drawee, on the
ground that it is not a proper party to make presentment to itself. See
Pinkney v. Kanawha Valley Bank, 68 W. Va. 254, 69 S. E. 1012 (1910)
(although the drawee is the only bank in that place).42Supra n. 40.
"This situation has been characterized as anomalous. Cf. German Na-
tional Bank v. Burns, 12 Colo. 539, 21 Pae. 714 (1889), (certificate of de-
posit).
"The Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 16 has a similar provision. It further pro-
vides that "Items refused payment because of missing endorsement or other
informality may, without liability for so doing, be certified before being
returned for correction."
4r78 Mont. 48, 252 Pac. 373 (1926), which states that a similar holding
in Pennsylvania in the case of Wisner v. First National Bank of Gallitzin,
220 Pa. 21, 68 Atl. 955, was later changed by legislation to the effect that
said provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law should not apply to checks.
See annotation in (1929) 63 A. L. R. 1140, for eases on this point. The plain
inference from the provision of the Uniform Act is that liability is to attach
to the drawee for failure to give credit or make remittance. See the Com-
mittee's comment following § 16, supra n. 44.
A statute, in effect the same as the Montana statute, is in force in West
Virginia, W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 46, art. 10, § 6. See also Blackwelder
v. Fergus Motor Company, supra n. 11.
8
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other bank,' and may be the result of previous request by Bank
1, or subsequent acceptance of an unrequested credit.'7 In either
case, when such credit is "unconditional," Bank 1 becomes debtor
for the item to the same effect as if it had actually received the
same in money. Remittance, under the common-law, could only
be made in cash. As recently as 1924 the Supreme Court of the
United States held, in Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy'8 that un-
less specially authorized, a collecting bank has no authority to
accept anything other than money. The North Carolina court
went, perhaps, even further in the case of Morris v. Cleve,' hold-
ing that when the drawee remits by draft which is subsequently
dishonored, the drawer of the original item is discharged from
liability on the check and on the debt for which the check was
given in payment. This decision was reached notwithstanding
that the statute" permitted remittance by draft on Federal Re-
4 Code, supra n. 1, § 9; Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 30. The latter provides:
"Credit, other than provisional credit, given pursuant to authorization, ex-
press or implied, will constitute a receipt of proceeds and a redeposit of a
similar amount with the crediting bank, and in the case of provisional credit
will constitute a receipt of proceeds with like effect when the crediting bank,
if itself the payor, shall have paid the item, or, if any other bank, shall have
itself received the proceeds thereof."
"Ibid.
"264 U. S. 160, 44 S. Ct. 296 (1924). The facts were as follows: De-
fendant drew cheek on A bank, in North Carolina, payable to Plaintiffs. They
received it in Georgia, deposited it in B bank in Florida, for collection and
credit. B bank sent Plaintiffs a credit card stating that "Checks, drafts,
etc., received for collection or deposit, are taken at the risk of the indorser
until actual payment it received." B bank endorsed the check, sent it to C
bank, which sent it to D bank. D stamped the check with the double indorse-
ment of itself and of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, and sent it to
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond for collection and credit. The latter
mailed the check, with others, in a -letter to A bank, drawee. Upon receipt
thereof, defendant's check was stamped "paid" and charged to his account.
A bank then sent to the Richmond bank its check on X bank as remittance.
Richmond Bank sent the same to X bank, which, on receipt, wired that there
were not sufficient funds. After some delay, A bank was closed. Each bank
in the collection chain charged the check against its forwarder, and the Rich-
mond bank retained the check on X bank. This action was based on alleged
negligence of the Richmond bank in forwarding the check directly to the
drawee and in negligently accepting its check in payment. For opinions of
the lower courts see: 281 Fed. 997 (1922), and 291 Fed. 763 (C. C. A. 4th
1923). The case has been adversely criticized in Transcontinental Oil Co. v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 172 Minn. 58, 214 N. W. 918 (1927) and by Turner,
Ban7. Collections-The Direct Bouting Practice (1930) 39 YAL. L. J. 468,
at 483.
"197 N. C. 253, 148 S. E. 253 (1929). See: Proposals For Legislation in
North Carolina, (1930) 6 N. C. L. REV. 13, 16.
r"This statute provided that all checks shall "unless specified on the face
thereof to the contrary by the maker or makers thereof, be payable at the
option of the drawee bank in exchange drawn on the reserve deposits of said
drawee bank when any such check is presented by or through any Federal
Reserve Banc , , , , "
9
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serve deposits, on the ground that the statute was enacted for the
convenience of banks and was not intended to deal with the rights
or liabilities of depositors. To eliminate the unfortunate result
of such decisions it is provided that remittance may be made by
the drawee's check or draft on any other bank, or of "any other
bank upon any bank other than the drawee or payor," or by
customary local clearing-house settlement.'
Insolvency of the Bank of Deposit
As we have seen, under the Code the bank of deposit is the
agent of the depositor, and under the Uniform Act the purchaser
of the check, credit for which is given provisionally. Suppose A
is the payee of a check drawn by B on Bank 3, in another place.
He indorses it in blank and deposits it to his account in Bank 1,
the bank of deposit. Bank 1, if it is not a correspondent of Bank
3, will probably send the check to Bank 2, located either in a third
place, or in the same place where Bank 3 conducts business. If
Bank 2 is a correspondent of Bank 1, the latter will send the
check with instructions to collect and credit Bank l's account with
Bank 2, or Bank l's account with some other Bank. Bank 2 will
thereupon credit Bank 1 provisionally with the proceeds of the
check, and forward the same to Bank 3. If Bank 3 is a corres-
pondent of Bank 2 the latter will also instruct Bank 3 to collect
and credit Bank 2's account with Bank 3, or Bank 2's account
with some other Bank. Bank 3, the drawee, upon receipt of the
check, charges it against B's account and enters the credit to the
account of Bank 2. The act of so doing constitutes a receipt by
Bank 2 of the proceeds, without further ado, and also a receipt by
Bank 1 of the proceeds, to the same effect. Thus, should Bank
1 become insolvent thereafter, the depositor, A, suffers the loss.
Under the Code, this result obtains on the theory that the bank
of deposit, having received the proceeds, its function as agent is
terminated and it becomes the debtor of A. Under the Uniform
Act the bank of deposit, having received the proceeds, the credit
which it gave as purchaser becomes non-provisional, and it there-
fore is the debtor of A.
If the bank of deposit, after forwarding the check under the
"Code, supra n. 1, § 9; Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 41, which adds: " A
forwarding bank shall have authority in the absence of instructions to the
contrary to accept remittance in the form specified in this section or in any
other form, provided, that, if it accepts remittance in any form not here speci-
fied, it shall be responsible upon receipt thereof as for money."
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1932], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol38/iss3/4
WEST VI GINIA LAW QUARTERLY
circumstances stated above, should become insolvent before the
check is charged to the drawer's account, or credited by the drawee
to the forwarder, the question arises as to whether or not A may
stop the collection process or reclaim the proceeds of the check in
the hands of either Bank 2 or Bank 3.
Upon principle, A should have the right to revoke the
authority of the sub-agent and reclaim his property, if the rela-
tion is that of agency. In the absence of a provision in the Code,
a court would have to determine whether the bank of deposit was
an agent or a purchaser. This was the task of the court in Equit-
able Trust Company v. Rochling wherein a cashier's check was
involved, and in Latzko v. Equitable Trust Company,' not in-
volving a cashier's check. It was held in both cases that the bank
of deposit was a purchaser and, therefore, that the depositors
could not reclaim the proceeds from the receiver of the bank of
deposit. The Uniform Act ' expressly adopts this rule, as one of
the objects to be attained by treating the bank of deposit as a
purchaser. Under the Code, the depositor might protect himself
by procuring the drawer to stop payment on the check before it
was charged against his account.' Under the Uniform Act, the
drawer could stop payment so long as the check was in the hands
of Bank 2, the correspondent, but not after it was received by the
drawee.m ' It is submitted that the line drawn is arbitrary and
- 275 U. S. 248, 48 S. Ct. 58 (1927), where the facts were these: Rochling,
plaintiff, maintained an account with K, private bankers. On P's request, N
bank delivered to K its (N's) cashier's check for $30,000.00 payable to K,
"for the account" of plaintiff. Also on instruction B bank made a similar
transaction. Both checks were credited by K to plaintiff's account. Before
the checks were collected, K became bankrupt, but the proceeds came into the
hands of defendant, the trustee in bankruptcy. The question was whether K
received the two checks as owners, or as agents to collect for plaintiff. If
the latter, plaintiff was entitled to reclaim the proceeds.
.9 275 U. S. 254, 48 S. Ct. 60 (1927). In Fourth National Bank v. Bragg,
127 Va. 47, 102 S. E. 649 (1920) it was held that a draft deposited as cash
and placed to the credit of the depositor is not affected by the bank's indorse-
ment solely for collection, and negativing guarantees of title, etc.
4' Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 24: "Where an item has been purchased by
a bank, whether credit was given therefor provisionally or not, the depositor
thereof shall not be entitled to a preferred claim upon the insolvency of the
bank, or to reclaim the item, in the absence of additional circumstances giving
rise to a trust."
r4 This conclusion inevitably results from the absence of provision to the
contrary.
"Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 17: "An item presented by a customer to a
bank, over the counter for credit, through the clearing house for payment or
by mail for credit or for remittance, which is otherwise in order for payment,
shall be deemed properly payable, and payment thereof shall constitute a
discharge, notwithstanding that subsequent to its receipt: ..... ... (2)
A step-payment order may have been received." (Italics writer's).
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artificial, and of doubtful practical value, since even after receipt
of the check by the drawee, the drawer could withdraw his funds
over the counter and in that manner protect the original depositor
of the check. It is further submitted that the Code should be
clarified as to the rights of the owner of the check to reclaim the
proceeds.
Suppose each bank in the collection chain, beginning with the
bank of deposit, forwards with instructions to remit the proceeds,
rather than credit them. Such a situation is unlikely to
arise for the reason that each bank will forward to a cor-
respondent with which it customarily has credit transactions, or
reciprocal accounts. However, if the last correspondent has no
account with the drawee, the check will be sent "for remittance."
When the drawee honors the check and each bank remits by draft
or otherwise, no change in the rights of the depositor occurs. He
suffers the loss upon insolvency of the bank of deposit. Suppose
the bank next to the bank of deposit received the item with instruc-
tions to remit, but, after having received the proceeds and before
remitting the bank of deposit becomes insolvent. The collecting
bank may apply the proceeds to the payment of any indebtedness
owing to it by the bank of deposit unless the original item was
restrictively indorsed." In the latter case the collecting bank has
notice that the bank of deposit is not the owner of the check, and,
therefore, could not be the owner of its proceeds. In such case it
would seem that the collecting bank cannot apply the proceeds as
above stated." Neither the Code nor the Uniform Act expressly
covers the situation. Does the collecting bank have authority,
after notice of such insolvency, to proceed with remittance, as to
restrictively indorsed items? No provision of the law forbids such
action, but the proceeds coming into the hand of the receiver of
the bank of deposit would be the proceeds of the depositor, and he
would suffer no loss.
The item may be restrictively indorsed by the depositor, but
the bank of deposit may forward to its correspondent with in-
structions to collect and credit. The correspondent may then
enter a provisional credit and may also permit the bank of de-
posit to draw against the uncollected proceeds. In such a situa-
tion the depositor has no claim against the correspondent, upon
' Carroll v. Exchange Bank, 30 W. Va. 518, 4 S. E. 440 (1887) See Ameri-
can Exchange National Bank v. Theummler, 195 Il. 90, 62 N. E. 932, (1902),
a credit transaction.
13 Hoffman v. First National Bank, 46 N. J. L. 604, (1884), diotum.
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insolvency of the bank of deposit, before receipt of the proceeds,
because to the extent of such drawings the bank of deposit is
deemed to have received the proceeds." The depositor, if he has
not himself withdrawn the proceeds or permitted them to be credit-
ed to his account so as to become a mere creditor, would then as-
sert a preferred claim against his bank of deposit.'
The rights of the depositor upon failure of his bank of de-
posit may, then, be summarized as largely dependent upon whether
his indorsement is restrictive or non-restrictive.' He may protect
himself to some extent by the former, but in the ordinary case
upon receipt of the proceeds by the bank of deposit they are
credited to his drawing account, and he assumes the status of a
simple creditor.' He may, however, by such restrictive indorse-
ment protect himself against the consequences of insolvency while
"Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 30 provides, in part: "A bank which has
drawn against a provisional credit, which drawings have been paid, will be
deemed in receipt of the proceeds of the item to the extent of such draw-
ings." There is nothing in the context of this provision to indicate that it
is limited to purchased items only.
The Code, supra n. 1, § 2, has a somewhat different phraseology. Cf. the
final sentence in n. 31, supra.
0The Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 24, denies the depositor a preferred claim
against his bank of deposit only in the case of purchased items, whether
credit was given therefor provisionally or not. Cf. the text above n. 54, supra.
Cf. Alleman v. Sayre, 79 W. Va. 763, 91 S. E. 805 (1917), where, before
collection, the bank of deposit failed; afterwards the proceeds came into the
hands of the receiver. Held: the owner of the item could recover the pro-
ceeds; the relation between the owner and the bank of deposit was that of
principal and agent until actual collection.
"See the interesting case of Arnold v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Company,
195 X. C. 345, 142 S. E. 217 (1928), where the facts were as follows: Plain-
tiff deposited with the Jonesboro bank a draft payable to her order and
indorsed it in blank, and was given credit therefor subject to final payment
by the drawee. On the same day the Jonesboro bank forwarded the draft
to defendant for collection and credit, which credited the Jonesboro bank
with the amount thereof on December 31st. The defendant forwarded the
draft to its New York correspondent and the drawee paid the draft on January
4th. The Jonesboro bank closed on January 8th.
The court said: "The liability of the trust company (Jonesboro bank)
to plaintiff, and of defendant to the trust company, after the payment of the
draft, became absolute. . . . Conceding that, until the payment of the draft
by the drawee and its collection by the defendant, the relation between the trust
company and the defendant, with respect to the draft, was that of principal
and agent, for collection, it is clear, we think, that after the payment and
collection of the draft, and after its proceeds had been absolutely credited
to the trust company by the defendant, this relation ceased to exist.......
The draft having been paid by the drawee and its proceeds collected by the
defendant, its liability to the trust company, by reason of its contract became
that of a debtor, and not a collecting bank." (Italics writer's).
"-The Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 26, provides in part: "A bank which has
received an item as agent for collection for a customer having a drawing
account shall in the absence of instructions to the contrary credit the proceeds
when received to such account."
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the item is in the course of collection. It has been held that when
the indorsement shows that the item was deposited for collection
the correspondent is liable to the owner on the insolvency of the
forwarding bank unless the correspondent has remitted the pro-
ceeds before knowledge thereof.' No provision of the Code covers
the point. It is submitted that it should be expressly provided
that the correspondent may remit to the receiver of the insolvent
whose duty should be to pay over the proceeds immediately to the
depositor. Otherwise the latter will be forced to deal or litigate
with an out-of-town bank with which he has had no prior relations.
It is further submitted that some provision should expressly cover
the termination of authority to collect restrictively indorsed items,
upon insolvency of the forwarder before collection from the
drawer."
Insolvency of the Drawee Bank
The insolvency of the drawee may occur either before or
after it has charged the item to the drawer's account. In the
latter case vital distinctions depend upon the method of payment
to its forwarder, i. e., whether by credit or by remittance.
When the drawee becomes insolvent before having charged
the item to the drawer's account, it is clear that it should have
no authority to honor the item since its powers as a going con-
cern have been terminated. The loss, therefore, should fall on
the drawer, who has chosen his banking connections and should
incur the risk of its solvency. The Code is quite clear as to this
matter.' In many cases, however, the drawee retains the item and
neither returns it nor charges the drawer's account, and in the
meantime continues to pay checks over the counter. This is
plainly unfair to the drawer of the mail item. The Code" pro-
vides that where the drawee retains an item without remitting
therefor on the day of receipt, the forwarder may treat it as dis-
cCommercial Bank v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 S. Ct. 533 (1893). Cf.
Bank v. Gilman, 152 N. Y. 634, 46 N. E. 1145 (1897), affirming 81 Hun. 486,
30 N. Y. Supp. 1111.
See Morris & Co. v. Alabama Carbon Company, 139 Ala. 620, 36 So. 764
(1904).
"Code, supra n. 1, § 13, First. The Uniform Act, supre n. 2, § 50, may be
broad enough to cover the point: "Where a collecting bank holds a dishon-
ored item it shall be the duty of the bank, in the absence of instructions to
the contrary, to return the item to its customer not later than the next busi-
ness day; ..... "
eCode, supra n. 1, § 11, Fourth.
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honored. The Uniform Act' places a duty on the drawee to give
credit or make remittance promptly, but in no event later than
the next succeeding business day. And, sho-ld the drawee fail
to take action as to the item, it is regarded as dishonored." The
writer submits that such a disposition of the rights of the itrawer
is open to question. On principle it would seem clear that the
drawer could recover damages for breach of the contract to honor
his checks properly drawn, indorsed and presented.' But, what-
ever his theoretical rights may be, he is virtually deprived of a
remedy for the reason that the facts essential to his case are not
known to him, are unobtainable without circuitous litigation, and
a judgment recovered would have no preference. The Code ap-
parently recognizes a right in the drawee to make payment only
at its own counter,' but no mention of it is made in the Uniform
Act. On the whole, it is believed that there is much to be said
for the view that the drawee should be deemed' to have chargea
the drawer's account on the day that the item is received, when it
is otherwise properly payable. He is then placed on an equality
with other drawers whose checks may have been received on the
same day, under identical circumstances, but which have in fact
been charged to their accounts.
In any event, the drawer should be discharged when the item
is actually, visibly charged to his account on the bank's records.
The Uniform Act" selects this point, rather than others which
might conceivably have been selected." On the contrary, the Code
0Uniform Act, .supra n. 2, § 16, which also provides: "Items refused pay-
ment because of missing endorsement or other informality may, without lia-
bility for so doing, be certified before being returned for correction."
"Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 15, the pertinent part of which is: I" .....
should the payor close without taking action the item shall be regarded as
dishonored by non-payment and any ensuing delay in taking measures to
charge secondary parties shall be excused."
For a general, brief discussion of the liability of a bank for refusing to
honor checks drawn by a depositor see Brady, op. cit. supra n. 19.
70Code, supra n. 1, § 11: "Provided, however, That in any case where the
drawee or payor bank shall return any such item unpaid not later than the
day of receipt or of maturity as aforesaid in the exercise of its right to make
payment only at its own counter, such item cannot be treated as dishonored
by non-payment and the delay caused thereby shall not relieve prior parties
from liability."
"See comment, n. 45, supra.
tUniform Act, spra n. 2, § 15. In addition, the item is treated as paid,
although not charged to the drawer's account, upon: " (1) Receipt by the
payor of any agreed equivalent as payment of the item; ..... .(3) Credit
being given or remittance being made for the item according to authority."
Cf. Hirning v. Federal Reserve Bank, 42 F. (2d) 925 (1930).
1See the exhaustive article by Prof. Roscoe B. Turner, op. cit. 8upra n. 48,
hereinafter more fully mentioned.
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unreasonably and arbitrarily, it would seem, permits the forward-
ing bank to treat the item as dishonored notwithstanding that the
drawer's account has been charged, or the item returned to him,
in the cases therein enumerated." This provision seems especially
ill-conceived when it is considered that whether or not the drawer
is discharged depends purely upon the arbitrary election of the
forwarder. The only limit fixed is that its election must be ex-
ercised with reasonable diligence. One can imagine two drawers
in similar situations at the same time, one of whom is discharged
at the election of the forwarder of his item, and the other of whom
finds his checks dishonored. There appears to be very little of
justice or of common-sense in this treatment.
In the case where the drawee receives the item with instruc-
tions to collect and credit, no preferred claim is" or should be
allowed after the item is charged to the account of the drawer and
credited to the forwarder pursuant to instructions. The forward-
ing bank, having voluntarily entered into the relation of creditor
of the drawee has received payment of the proceeds as effectually
as if it had received the actual currency and redeposited it with
the drawee, and should, therefore, incur the risk of its insolvency.
When, however, the drawee receives the item with instructions
to collect and remit the proceeds, the question is whether or not,
after having charged the drawer's account, such proceeds con-
stitute a trust fund which can be reclaimed from the drawee as a
preference in the distribution of its assets. The problem is, per-
"Code, supra n. 1, § 11, the applicable part of which provides:
"Where an item is duly presented by mail to the drawee or payor, whether
or not the same has been charged to the account of the maker or drawer
thereof or returned to such maker or drawer, the agent collecting bank so
presenting may, at its election, exercised with reasonable diligence, treat
such item as dishonored by non-payment and recourse may be had upon prior
parties thereto in any of the following cases:
First: Where the check or draft of the drawee or payor bank upon another
bank received in payment therefor shall not be paid in due course;
Second: Where the drawee or payor bank shall without request or author-
ity tender as payment its own check or draft upon itself or other instrument
upon which it is primarily liable;
Third: Where the drawee or payor bank shall give an unrequested or un-
authorized credit therefor on its books or the books of another bank; or
Fourth: Where the drawee or payor shall retain such item without remitting
therefor on the day of receipt or on the day of maturity if payable otherwise
than on demand and received by it prior to or on such day of maturity."
The report of the Commissioners characterizes this section as going to an
"unwarranted extreme." See comment to Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 15.
See Note 12 CORN. L. Q. 364 (1927) for a discussion of the conflicting cases
dealing with dishonor of the drawee's remittance draft.
"Code, supra n. 1, § 13, Second. See the full text, infra n. 80, noted in
(1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 297.
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haps, most frequently presented by dishonor of the drawee's re-
mittance draft. The modern trend seems to favor the allowance
of the preferred claim, without the aid of statute, on the ground
that the drawee is agent of the forwarder for transmission of
specific funds collected, rather than its debtor. Thus, in Central
Trust Company v. Bank of Mullens," the defendant was on the
par list of the plaintiff, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, and
by agreement the former received for collection checks drawn up-
on itself, sent by the plaintiff, and agreed to remit forthwith by
draft on certain designated banks, one of which was the Roanoke
bank. On April 14, 1927, plaintiff sent several checks to de-
fendant, which, on April 16th, remitted for part of them by draft
on the Roanoke bank. A similar transaction was also handled
by a like remittance on April 18th. The checks were charged to
the accounts of the drawers.
The remittance drafts were presented for payment on April
19th, and refused on April 20th because of the temporary closing
of defendant. There were sufficient funds to defendant's credit
in the Roanoke Bank to pay the exchange drafts at all times.
Later, the Roanoke bank applied the defendant's deposit with it to
the satisfaction of certain notes, and released to the receiver the
collateral security therefor.
As an additional supporting ground the court relied on the
theory that the drafts constituted an equitable assignment pro
tanto of the funds in the Roanoke bank, as against the drawer of
- 108 W. Va. 12, 150 S. E. 137 (1929). See also Central Trust Company v.
Bank of Mullens, 109 W. Va. 119, 153 S. E. 145 (1930), where the facts were
as follows:
C had a savings account in the defendant bank. On April 9, 1927 he de-
livered to plaintiff, in Williamson, his pass-book and a check for the full
amount of his savings. Plaintiff immediately sent both to the defendant,
requesting collection and remittance. The check and pass-book were received
by the defendant on April 12th, and on the same day it issued a cashier's
check and forwarded the same to the plaintiff. C's account was then charged
and closed. Plaintiff credited C with the proceeds (who withdrew $230.00)
and sent the cashier's check through the Federal Reserve. It reached de-
fendant on the same day it closed. The defendant at all times had on hand
cash enough to pay the check.
HeZd: Defendant was agent of the plaintiff, and held the proceeds in trust
and not as debtor; and that the drawing and delivery of the cashier's check
was an assignment pro tanto of that sum from the defendant's funds. There-
fore, plaintiff was entitled to a preference. The case is commented upon in
Note (1930) 37 W. VA. L. QUAR. 88.
See Federal Reserve Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924)
Accord.
Cf. Hecker, etc., Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass. 181, 136 N. E.
333, 24 A. L. R. 1148 (1922), refusing a trust; and the annotation in 24
A. L. R. 1152, supplemented in (1925) 42 A. L. R. 754, and in (1927) 47
A. L. R. 761.
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the check It was argued by counsel for the appellee that there
had been no augmentation of the defendant's assets, and that the
trust res had not been traced into the assets coming into the hands
of the receiver. As to the latter contention, the court said: " ...
there was on hand in the Bank of Mullens and its Roanoke de-
pository sufficient cash to pay the plaintiff's drafts. Therefore,
under the trust fund theory, as above described, the plaintiff was
entitled to a preference .... ".
The essence of any trust consists in the continued existence
of a specific, traceable res legal title to which is in the trustee but
which is equitably owned by the cestui que trust. In the case of
the proceeds of a collected check these requirements do not, of
course, call for the ear-marking of specific 'currency. But, on
principle, it must appear that the cash in the vaults of the drawee
was not at any time less than the amount of the item collected.
A .subsequent increase in such cash, after having once been de-
pleted, is plainly of no consequence. It is elementary that if A
is trustee of $1000.00 and wrongfully spends it for an automobile,
a trust can be asserted against the latter; but the fact that the
next day A is bequeathed $1000.00 by his grandmother cannot
transfer the trust to the bequest as against A's general creditors.
The difficulty cannot be overcome by substituting for the trust
res consisting of assets actually in the bank, the obligation of a
third party to the trustee. It is submitted that the Central Truss
Company case is erroneous in overruling this contention."
Professor Turnere reaches the conclusion that "In the last
analysis the issue is between the owner of the collection item and
the general creditors of the failed drawee, including its depositors.
.... To allow the holder a preferred claim in a large measure
compensates him for the many increased risks forced upon him
by the direct routing practice." On the other hand, Professor
Townsend7 states that upon principle the better view is that the
drawee is not the forwarder's agent, but simply its debtor whether
the item was sent for collection and credit or for collection and
remittance, for the reason that the drawee is not expected to remit
by anything but draft or credit unless specifically instructed to
the contrary. Thus, once remittance has been made in the usual
77For an excellent and exhaustive, treatment of the whole trust theory see
Townsend, Constructive Trusts and Bank Collections (1390) 39 YALE L. J.
980 (1930). See also Bryan, Trust N1ature of Collection Items, 13 VA. L.
EG. (N. S.) 1.
Turner, op. cit. supra n. 48.
1' Townsend, op. cit. supra n. 77.
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or the authorized manner there is no longer any basis for a trust
except in cases where the bank, by receiving the item when its
officers knew of the insolvency, becomes a trustee ex mraleficio.
Since there is no possibility of reconciling the cases, the legis-
lature was free to choose between the two lines of precedents.
Accordingly the Code allows a preference in the assets of the
failed drawee, when the drawer's account has been charged, ex-
cept in those cases where the forwarder elects to treat the original
item as dishonored. The Uniform Acte also allows a preference
(without such exception), but eliminates from the assets of the
drawee subject to the preference "previously acquired bank
buildings and other real estate and its fixtures and equipment."
Without the aid of such statutes it is possible that the payee
of the original item may suffer the loss without any remedy what-
soever, much less a preferred claim. It was so held in City of
Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.' There, the payee
attempted to recover from an intermediate correspondent upon
dishonor of the drawee's remittance draft, on the ground of negli-
gence in sending the item directly to the drawee and in accepting
its draft in payment. The drawer having been discharged, plain-
tiff was left with no remedy, the New York collection rule being
followed by the federal courts.
Although the drawer is released when his account is charged,
the payee of the check quite often expects him to "make it good,"
especially when such payee has been diligent in depositing the
0Code, supra n. 1, § 13: "Second: Except in cases where an item or items
is treated as dishonored by non-payment as provided in section eleven, when a
drawee or payor bank has presented to it for payment an item or items drawn
upon or payable by or at such bank and at the time has on deposit to the
credit of the maker or drawer an amount equal to such item or items and
such drawee or payor shall fail or close for business as above, after having
charged such item or items to the account of the maker or drawer thereof
or otherwise discharged his liability thereon but without such item or items
having been paid or settled for by the drawee or payor either in money or
by an unconditional credit given on its books or on the books of any other
bank, which has been requested or accepted so as to constitute such drawee
or payor or other bank debtor therefor, the assets of such drawee or payor
shall be impressed with a trust in favor of the owner or owners of such
item or items for the amount thereof, or for the balance payable upon a
number of items which have been exchanged, and such owner or owners shall
be entitled to a preferred claim upon such assets, irrespective of whether
the fund representing such item or items can be traced and identified as
part of such assets or has been intermingled with or converted into other
assets of such failed bank;")
mUniform Act, supra n. 2, § 31.
2 300 Fed. 573 (1924), affirmed in 2 F. (2d) 818, affirmed in 271 U. S.
489, 46 S. Ct. 554 (1926). See comment on this case by Prof. Turner, op.
oit. supra n. 25.
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check for collection. He quite reasonably takes the attitude that
lie did everything possible to collect the check, and that the re-
sulting loss or inconvenience in asserting a preferred claim should
be borne by the drawer, who after all, voluntarily chose to deal
with the failed bank and was in a better position to judge of its
solvency. It is no answer to say that the payee was not compelled
to accept a check in payment, but could have insisted upon cur-
rency. Business is simply not conducted on any such basis. These
considerations naturally suggest the possibility of placing upon
the drawer, notwithstanding that he has been discharged, the bur-
den of proving the preferred claim. Of course, if the drawer him-
self is on the verge of insolvency, the payee may be in a better
position by asserting a preferred claim against the bank. In the
absence of that fact there is something to be said for a view which
would permit the payee to treat the item as dishonored. He could
then demand full payment from the drawer, who, in turn, would
be entitled to an assignment from the payee of his right to a pre-
ferred claim. No mention is made in either the Code or the
Uniform Act of the possibility of such assignments.
The courts would probably have some difficulty in devising
a rationale to justify such an assignment, especially if it were
to depend upon the election of the payee. If practical considera-
tions must be made subservient to formulae, some amiable fictions
might be pressed into service. Of course, any such suggestion
plays havoc with logic, doctrine and the true facts. On the whole,
if the payee is to be given such rights, it should be done by statute
providing for an assignment. The latter would constitute tangi-
ble evidence of the rights of the parties, something which both
the Code and the Uniform Act do not seem to regard as im-
portant.
As to the latter point, it is one thing that statutes glibly con-
fer certain rights, and quite another that the original parties have
no accessible, tangible evidence of them. Amid the confusion in-
cident to a bank's closing substantially all that the parties have
is the returned check. They cannot get into the bank, and if they
could the records would be unintelligible. The chief constructive
criticism of importance which this writer would make in relation
to the foregoing statutes is this: they should expressly provide
that the bank of deposit and the receiver of the closed bank,
whether the drawee or an intermediate correspondent, should be
under the duty of providing the owner and the drawer respective-
ly with a clear, concise statement of the true facts as shown by
20
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the records and correspondence, indicating when, where and
against what party, the preferred claim is to be asserted.
Insolvency of Correspondent Banks
The term "correspondent" is used in this connection to indi-
cate any bank in the collection chain other than the initial bank
of deposit and the drawee. As we have seen,' correspondents are
sub-agents of the depositor, except as otherwise provided by agree-
ment, and except as to items payable to bearer, or indorsed
specially or in blank In the latter instances they are entitled to
rely upon the presumption that the bank of deposit is owner of
the item, and this presumption is available to each bank in the
collection chain provided there is nothing upon the face of the
paper or in any prior indorsement to indicate an agency or trustee
relation of any prior party.' The correspondent may convert any
blank or special indorsement into a restrictive indorsement by
writing over the indorsement the words "for deposit" or "for
-collection" or words of like import; and, as to bearer items, by the
words "received for deposit" or "received for collection," or
words of like import.'
The indorsement "pay any bank or banker" is also restrictive
under the Code,' but non-restrictive under the Uniform Act.' In
the former, it carries certain guaranties to subsequent holders.'
In the latter, the specified warranties are binding upon every
person, whether an agent or not.'
In the ordinary collection case, where the collecting bank has
given its forwarder provisional credit for the item, and each bank
in the chain likewise gives such credit, payment by charging the
account of the drawer automatically constitutes payment to each
"3Code, upra n. 1, § 2.
" Code, supra n. 1, § 4.
MIbid.
"Ibm.
6TUniform Act, supra n. 2, § 2.
631 ..... of the genuineness of and the authority to make prior indorse-
ments and also to save the drawee or payor harmless in the event any prior
indorsement appearing thereon is defective or irregular in any respect unless
such indorsement is coupled with appropriate words disclaiming such liability
as guarantor."
81 Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 5: 'Every person, whether an agent or not,
who without express stipulation to the contrary, indorses in his own name an
item issued by or drawn on or payable at a bank warrants to subsequent
holders and to such bank: (1) that he has a good title to the item; (2) that
the item has not been raised or otherwise materially altered; and (3) that
he has no knowledge that the drawer's signature is forged or unauthorized."
21
Donley: Some Problems in the Collection of Checks
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1932
PROBLEMS IN COLLECTION OF CHECKS
correspondent," and to the bank of deposit. Should the corres-
pondent thereafter become insolvent, its immediate forwarder
would bear the loss, and the owner of the original item is, of
course, protected.'
A second situation is presented when the correspondent, hav-
ing received payment of the item, remits by draft to its forwarder
and becomes insolvent before such remittance draft is honored.
Since the latter could not constitute payment to the forwarder,"
the proceeds are still in the hands of the collecting bank and the
owner must resort to a preferred claim.' The original item is,
in such cases, charged back to its depositor," and there is no possi-
bility of holding the drawer. Thus, the distinction is to be noted
that in the case where each bank in the collection chain gives
provisional credit, the loss arising out of the insolvency of the
correspondent will be borne by its immediate forwarder, without
a preferred claim; whereas, in the remittance case, the risk is
thrown on the depositor, who in compensation therefor is given a
preference.
A third situatioii arises when one correspondent, after re-
ceiving payment from its correspondent in the form of a remit-
tance instrument, itself remits, and thereafter said remittance
draft which it received in payment is dishonored. In that event
the loss falls neither on the depositor of the original item nor on
the bank of deposit, but on the correspondent receiving the dis-
honored remittance instrument. It, likewise, then asserts a pre-
ferred claim.'
0Code, supra n. 1, § 10; Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 30, quoted supra n. 46.
See n. 46, supra.
Code, supra n. 1, § 13, Third; Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 31.
C3 rid.
"Code, supra n. 1, § 2, by the provisions of which the credit for the
original item is "revocable until such time as the proceeds are received in
actual money."
Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 33, providing that "A provisional credit given
for a purchased item may be charged back at any time, although the item
has been paid and whether or not it can be returned, provided the bank has
not received the proceeds of the item, or provided, if received, the same were
in the form of a draft or other remittance instrument which upon due pre-
sentment was dishonored .... '
"The correspondent is the "owner" of the item, in such case, within the
terms of the Code, supra n. 1, § 13, Third; but, as pointed out in the Com-
mittee's note to § 33 of the Uniform Act, the Code fails to provide the means
whereby the correspondent may obtain reimbursement.
The latter section provides that "The dishonored remittance item, if ob-
tainable, shall be returned to the forwarder, or if in purported settlement for
more than one collection item, be held in trust for prior parties as their
interests may appear."
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A fourth situation arises when the correspondent, after hav-
ing given provisional credit to its forwarder, fails before the item
is charged to the drawer's account by the drawee, and credited
to the correspondent. If, after such failure and before notice
thereof, the drawee does enter the credit, the correspondent is in
the position of having failed before receiving the proceeds of the
original item.' No preferred claim can then be asserted by its
forwarder.
If, however, in the situation just supposed, the collecting
bank received the original item with instructions to remit, a dif-
ferent result takes place under the Uniform Act. The Code, in
such a case, denies a preferred claim as it does in the credit case,
for the reason that the collecting bank has not closed after having
received the proceeds, which is one of the essentials of the prefer-
ence under Section 13, Third." The Uniform Act"' makes no dis-
tinction as to when the collecting bank received payment, whether
before or after its closing. The preference is dependent upon
failure to make remittance before closing, regardless of when it
received payment of the original item. In other words, a prefer-
ence is allowed upon failure to remit although payment of the
original item was not received until after the bank closed. This
is plainly correct, on principle, for the reason that the proceeds
although received after insolvency, are not assets of the bank, but
are received only as agent for transmission to its forwarder ac-
cording to remittance instructions. It is, therefore, submitted that
the Code is defective in making the preference dependent upon
an entirely irrelevant matter, viz., the time of receiving payment.
The item is then charged back to the original depositor under the
provisions of both laws, and, under the Code, he apparently has
no more than a common claim against the failed correspondent.
The Code, supra n. 1, § 13, Third, allows a preference only "Where an
agent collecting bank other than the drawee or payor shall fail or be closed
for business as above, after having received in any form the proceeds of an
item or items entrusted to it for collection, but without such item or items
having been paid or remitted for by it . . . .' (Italics writer's).
The Uniform Act, supra n. 2, § 31, does not provide for a preference in
the credit cases, but only where the collecting bank has "received an item
for remittance ..
P? 7id.
03Ibid., which provides in part: "Where a collecting bank having received
an item for remittance shall close for any reason before making remittance
in proper form, which upon due presentment is not dishonored, a debtor
creditor relation shall not arise, but .... in the case of any . . . . collecting
bank, if it shall have received the proceeds of the item, the payment or
proceeds shall be deemed held in trust .... I
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CONCLUSIONS
It must be apparent that both acts (the Uniform Act to a
lesser extent), tend to favor banks rather than their depositors.
It would seem that the original depositor of the item should incur
no risk as a common creditor beyond the insolvency of his bank
of deposit. As between the original depositor and the drawer this
writer submits that it is in accordance with their intention to in-
sist upon unconditional, undeferred payment. This result could
be obtained by requiring the drawer to assert the preferred claim
against the drawee by assignment from the depositor.
The drawer as a common creditor, should incur the risk of
insolvency of the drawee only until the item is received by it for
payment. If it fails to charge his account, the law should deem
to have been done that which ought to have been done. Then, in
the credit case, the loss should fall on the immediate forwarder.
In the remittance case, as above stated, a preferred claim should
be allowed, but asserted by the drawer.
As to insolvency of intermediate collecting banks, in the
credit case the loss should fall on the immediate forwarder, which
chose to rely upon its solvency. In the remittance case, the risk
can logically and fairly be placed only on the original depositor,
but he should have the protection of a preferred claim.
The rationale of these conclusions rests upon the broad princi-
ple that he who voluntarily chooses his debtor should incur the
risks of a creditor. And, he who willy-nilly becomes a creditor
should have the protection of a preference in the debtor's
assets.
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